I thought this post of John C Wright’s was quite good: http://www.scifiwright.com/2016/09/parable-of-the-naughts-and-crosses/
While I disagreed with a lot of it, it was thoughtful and structured. Indeed, it makes the contrast with his posts on Islam, politics or sexuality seem worse in comparison – Wright is capable of arguing on the basis of something other than appeals to fear and mangled history.
There are two elements intertwined here.
- An appeal to Aristotle’s concept of final causes
- A very interesting example of the issue of meaning.
I’ll come back to point 1. later as this is the issue on which I made comments and to which there were interesting replies.
Point 2 was this:
Suppose you had a deck, not of 52 cards, but of each move of the 255,168 possible unique tic-tac-toe games. The cards are kept in a chest of drawers. Each drawer is also marked with a diagram of a possible board. Within each drawer is every legal move that can be made in response.
Two instructions are carved into the top of the chest of drawers. The first says to compare the diagram on the drawer with the board, open the drawer, and play a card within. The second says that, as you play each game, whenever you lose, you throw away the card representing the losing move from the drawer representing the previous move. That way, next time you play the game, the move that lost is not the one among the available options to play from that drawer.
Now, suppose your grandfather avidly played tictactoe and carefully threw out every card that represents a losing move. The Naughts and Crosses chest would now only contain cards leading to victory or stalemate.
Again, suppose you inherit the chest and do not know the rules of the game, and no one ever told you the victory conditions. Nonetheless, merely by following the instructions carved in the lid of how to open the drawer and play a card taken blindly from inside that drawer, you can win or stalemate every game.
Now suppose a philosopher strolls up while you are on the last move of a winning game. There are two crosses in in the upper left and right squares, and your opponent has not placed a naught in the upper middle square to block.
You inspect the board, find the drawer that represents it, and open it. Inside is a single card showing the winning move. You follow the card’s instructions and place a third cross in the upper middle square.
The philosopher asks, “Why did you make that move? What was your aim?”
You explain the mechanisms of the chest carefully to him. You show him that your grandfather threw out all the other cards which would have you place a cross elsewhere on the board. There was only one card in this drawer.
The philosopher says, “No, you have told me the mechanics of how you select which move to play. You have not told me what the purpose, point, or aim of the move itself is.”
You look carefully over the chest of drawers. Nowhere are the rules of ticatactoe written down, nor the victory conditions.
The other player says, “The victory condition is to place three a row, either horizontally, diagonally, or vertically.”
Now, studying the chest of drawers a second time, you do notice that all the possible moves of the cards your grandfather did not throw away do, in fact, fit the pattern of being intentional moves meant to bring about the three in a row for crosses while preventing three in a row for naughts.
The word ‘pattern’ here refers to no material property of the chest or the cards, but to the model you carry in your head that you use to deduce the purpose or aim of the grandfather’s chest. The word ‘pattern’ refers to the form.
The pattern is not in the chest, but in the head of you, the gameplayer.
Firstly, it is worth pointing out that it certainly is possible to create a machine learning noughts-and-crosses machine using very basic technology. I can’t find the reference, but in one of Martin Gardener’s many books of recreational maths, he had an example that worked stochastically with marbles in matchboxes. The mechanics of Wright’s example are not at issue.
Some commenters drew comparisons between Wright’s example and John Searle’s Chinese Room analogy. Wright’s example is both stronger and weaker. It is weaker in the sense that it isn’t directly addressing an artificial intelligence and stronger for the same reason. He is using an example of something that could be built and then pointing out that even though this thing could ‘play’ tic-tac-toe very well there is no meaning to be found anywhere in it.
Wright returns to the first point at the end of the post:
Now, having gone over this argument countless times, I will point out that no materialist deigning to present an argument has ever once given even a single example of describing a why as a how, or describing a final cause in terms of mechanical cause, reducing a quality to a quantity, or defining a quality to a quantity.
I think this has a clear answer and that answer helps us start to untangle what is going on, but I’ll save that for another post.
At the discussion at John C Wright’s, I didn’t get to discussing my thinking about what I think free-will is. Because the discussion was couched in terms of Wright’s religious stance, I ended up at this point a lot quicker. I won’t repeat what I said there but I’ll rephrase and explain.
A divine being which is both all-knowing and all-powerful is incompatible with free-will.
I think this is obvious but there were friendly requests for explanation and it seemed to puzzle some people.
Firstly my point here is not to attempt to demonstrate the non-existence of god(s). A divine being need not be wholly omniscient or wholly omnipotent. More importantly, a divine being might be both but transcend logical inquiry. This last notion of a god being beyond logic is an old one but it is also one at odds with the perspective of Thomas Aquinas.
Of course omniscience and omnipotent create their own logical conundrums but I’m not addressing those either. My point here is just about free-will.
Firstly, while omniscience looks like a challenge to free-will, I don’t think by itself it makes free-will impossible. The first meat-robot post described some kinds of extreme knowledge from a non-theological perspective and those did not repudiate the kind of free-will I have in my mind. A god who knows everything you are going to do but NEVER TELLS YOU could be compatible with what I called free-will.
Some limited kinds of omniscience also seem compatible with free-will in general. For example, a being at the end of the universe who knows everything that happened prior could be said to be omniscient but as all our decisions are in the past our free-will could still be intact.
We can also imagine a god who is potentially omniscient – i.e. there is nothing that they cannot know – but which is not actively omniscient as there are things they choose not to know.
Likewise, omnipotence is not, by itself, at odds with free-will. An omnipotent being could make you do something against your will or even make your will something different but it does mean that they will do so. Indeed the power to override free-will implies the existence of free-will (otherwise what is being overridden?)
Put the two together in the conventional notion of god and I believe you have an issue. A being that knows everything and can do anything has by action or inaction DECIDED everything. It ceases to be a god that knows what you are going to do and becomes a god that has chosen that is what will happen.
In our lives or politics, we might make an ethical distinction between action and inaction. We may see inaction as simply not interfering in a natural course of events and hence ethically different from action. While that is an interesting discussion at a human level, it makes no sense at the level of a divine, omniscient and omnipotent being. For such a being there is no ‘natural course of events’ that is bigger than they are, there are no unintended consequence.
If we also accept that such a being is also the creator of the universe then even the distinction between action and inaction becomes moot.
NOTE: omniscience,omnipotence and creatorhood don’t all HAVE to go together. I’m discussing a straw-god here to some extent. Reader’s own gods may differ in notable ways from this one.
So where am I going with this? I can see many paths a theist can take to accommodate free-will and a belief in god. However, I don’t think any of them are simple. Of course, the atheist and the agnostic don’t have simple solutions to free-will either – and neither does this atheist meat robot. My point is simply that god, gods and faith simply change the nature of the philosophical problems around free-will. As a meat robot, I prefer the philosophical problems I have with free-will in so far as I at least have a decent entry account of what I think I’m dealing with but I can appreciate that other people may prefer a different approach which involves spirituality or theology (or both).
John C Wright started an interesting discussion at his blog http://www.scifiwright.com/2016/08/a-general-query-to-all-panphysicalists-and-radical-materialists/
Let us cut to the chase.
Think back to the day when you first discovered that you were a meat robot without free will, without freedom, and without dignity. Did the discovery fill you with awe, rapture, wonder and gratitude?
For, if not, the discovery is false. Truth is majestic and majesty provokes awe; truth is sublimely beautiful and beauty provokes rapture; truth is startling, because it shatters the lies we tell ourselves, and the bright surprise leaves us blinking in wonder; truth is a gift to be prized above all price, and gifts provoke gratitude.
If the discovery of material did none of these things, either your reactions are miscalibrated and do not reflect reality, or your discovery was not a discovery at all, merely a falsehoods you have yet to test with due rigor.
So? What was your reaction?
There were two more posts and the discussion above was a follow on from previous discussions.
I hadn’t been commenting at JCW’s blog because it tended to cause more upset than discussion but this post looked like an invitation back. As it happens, things started to get weird and tense there and I opted out again. However, there were some intelligent questions asked and I said I’d try and address them.
And fair warning: this goes on a bit and involes some thought experiments about predicting other people’s behaviour which is neccesarily a bit creepy-when-you-think-about-it sort of philsophical scenario.
I’m not going to cite anybody in this chunk but the ideas below aren’t original.
Free will is conceptually a mess but it is also something people grasp as a thing they experience. When I say it is a mess, what I mean is:
- If you are Judeo-Christian-Islamic theist then you have to reconcile free-will with a god that can do anything and knows everything in advance.
- If you believe in any kind of determinism (physical or theological) then you have to somehow reconcile that with the supposed choices of free-will.
- If you believe the world is more unpredictable then you escape determinism but swap forced choices for random ones.
Free will is cognitive: it is about a person making free choices and deciding to do something. While that can encompass spontaneity or seemingly random acts, it isn’t confined to such acts. We would regard our rational and/or sensible choices to also be encompassed by free-will.
Also, we tend to see as our choices defining us – they are the kinds of things we would do. Our choices reflect our personality and our history. We can also reflect on our decision making and consider how the information we had, our emotional state, our personal goals and our personality influenced our decision.
Wright sees free-will as being particularly challenged by a physical view of reality. If I am a robot made of meat (I am – but one running a Camestros Felapton module) then I am like a clockwork machine and my thought processes are reducible to atoms moving about and hence no free-will. I’ll put aside, for the time being, the question of things being usefully reducible to physics
I’ll put aside, for the time being, the question of things being usefully reducible to physics. At a broader level, my mind is the operations of my brain and my brain operates at levels some of which I’m not conscious of. This can be alarming because it begins to sound like my brain is in charge of me rather than my mind.
Neurologically there is apparent evidence for this, with some indication of things occurring in the brain pertaining to decisions before we are conscious of having made our decision.
I think this is actually unremarkable. Whether we imagine souls, gods, quantum effects creating intelligence or computer-like brains, an unconscious process will precede conscious ones. To imagine otherwise is to assert our thought processes transcend time and that is a point where I resort to saying that is just silly.
The problem is we really don’t have a good handle on what free-will is. As a consequence, we tie ourselves into paradoxes. So I’m going to assert what free-will is – again this is not original with me but I don’t have a pointer to a specific thinker who said this.
What Free Will Is
Imagine a person, call her Sue.
We have the power to predict what Sue will do. How have we got that power? You can pick the way you feel most comfortable with:
- Access to a parallel universe which is temporally further ahead than ours but otherwise the same (currently).
- An extraordinary computer simulation of Sue that tracks all inputs and physical states of Sue to produce a deterministic model of Sue that predicts exactly what she will do.
- An angel tells us what decisions Sue will make.
- All of these choices are actually a bit disturbing when you think about it and you’d rather not pick any of them, thanks very much.
It doesn’t matter which we pick. Somehow, we can know what Sue will do next.
I believe Sue can still have free-will in this scenario.
That is important. I’m not saying she must have free-will, it could still be a contingent fact about our universe that free-will is an illusion but even with the kind of determinism I just described, I think free-will is still possible. Having said that, we need to describe it carefully.
We meet Sue for a cup of coffee. Our predestination powers tell us that Sue will order a cappuccino. Note how unremarkable a prediction this is. It is the kind we make fairly reliably about people we know, despite not having any remarkable powers. However:
- Sue does not know about our power to see what she will do next.
- We have not told Sue that we know she will order a cappuccino.
Sue orders a cappuccino.
Over coffee, we explain to Sue that we have this incredible power to predict her decisions. Sue is naturally aghast at this gross invasion of her privacy, demands that we smash up the computer/stop accessing a parallel universe/stop talking to messed-up angels. Still, the idea gets stuck in Sue’s head and she decides to teach us a lesson.
She uses what we told her to build her own simulation/access a parallel universe/contact an angel and now has he power to see what WE will do next.
She asks to meet us for a cup of coffee. Before we order, Sue explains what she has done and also that she knows we will order a cup of tea. Because we are somewhat infantile and cross that Sue has neatly demonstrated how messed-up it would be to gain pre-knowledge of another persons actions, we rather petuantly decide to order a cappuccino.
- We order a cappuccino.
That is free will.
Sue asks us to check our Sue-predicting-powers and we discover that:
- Our parallel universe Sue is now an alt-history Sue and the universe is slightly different.
- Our computer model has diverged from Sue’s behaviour.
- The angle is lecturing us on how god works in mysterious ways.
Of those options, the only one I can actually garuntee is the computer one. Sue’s model of us and our model of Sue must contain everything Sue knows and believes about the world. Whether that is at fundamental level of how the data is encoded in neuron’s or pulses of electrons or arrangements of atoms or whether it is at a more comprehensible level, it doesn’t matter. All of us make decisions based on what we know and believe and have been told.
Sue predicted that we would order tea but that prediction did not contain the fact that she would tell us about the prediction. Our mental state is changed by Sue telling us about the prediction (which we believe because of our past experience with such predictions).
Sue could have anticipated this and fed back into the model of us that she would tell us about ordering tea. In that case her computer model then has to take into account its own predictions. Maybe it collapses into a self-reference paradox at that point or maybe it copes and says that I’ll order a cappucinno…but then Sue has to tell me I’ll order a capuccino…so I order tea…so Sue would need to feed in double, triple, quadruple layers of prediction. Even numbered predictions would be cappuccino and odd numbered would be tea.
This isn’t just an exercise in the logic of determinism. Socially and evolutionarily, other people need our behaviour to be predictable (it is how we all get along) and we need our behaviour to have the capacity to be surprising (it’s what stops people taking each other for granted).
Even at a very fallible level of predicting another person’s behaviour, we know that telling somebody what choice they will make in advance is at best cheeky and more generally is rude. The scenario above of some supposedly infallible predictor of a person’s behaviour is worse than rude but would be downright creepy, weird and unethical.
Meat robot is quite happy thanks
As a meat robot I’m confident I have free-will. My decisions are determined in the sense that the component parts of me together make up ME and it is the interaction of those parts on what I know and believe about the world that make up my decisions. That isn’t a loss of free-will, it is just being honest about who and what I am. I’m not an abstract geometrical point or a monad. I’ve got parts.
Within that framework, I can make sense of what it means for me to have free-will. Not only that, free-will makes sense LOGICALLY and also EVOLUTIONARILY.
- Logically because a deterministic prediction of what I will do is still something I can defy because such a prediction to be foolproof would require the capacity to model its own predictions in the event of me learning about its predictions. Heck, even decsribing the issue gets you into a self-referential nest.
- Evolutionarily because meat-robots are social animals and that requires us to be both predictable and surprising.
I’m not saying divine or metaphysical explanations of free-will are neccesarily wrong (although they have issues and I’ll touch on some of them in other posts) but I am saying free-will makes a lot of sense for a meat robot.